This Is Happiness
We’ve all chatted at length about how many things England/Fabio Capello/The Queen/Robert Green did wrong on Saturday, but really, must it be all about the bad? Can’t we find at least one or two elements of Bob “The Stare” Bradley did well?
I think we can, and I think I’m gonna try.
Bradley Got His Selections Right
Oh, how we mocked and groaned at Keeleys on Saturday when the team sheets were announced. Ned and I were crowing at the use of Robbie Findley and Ricardo Clark (I believe I called Bradley a “pussy” for going with two holding midfielders) for the USMNT, thinking it was unwise.
I thought Dempsey should be up front alongside Altidore, as I’m sure many of us did, simply because he’s got experience trying to score against these guys from his Fulham days and he provides additional physicality in the attacking third.
Though Findley had a subdued game by all accounts, his pace was a concern for the slower-moving objects known as Ledley King and John Terry, and his angles of running did create space for Jozy Altidore as the game wore on.
With Clark, as with many teams in the tournament that are relying heavily on a duo of defensive midfielders from the get-go, Bradley got the added steel he wanted in pressuring Rooney, Lennon and co. from getting too much dominance in the attacking third.
All in all, a fine job, because his personnel works well together. This brings me to point #2…
Bradley Got His Formation Right
But man, did I forget the USMNT’s base formation! Not really a 4-4-2, but a 4-2-2-2 in which the “wide” men Donovan and Dempsey crunch down into the middle when in possession or without. The net result is a truncated field of play in which the holding midfielders (Clark and Bradley) retain their stations in front of the back four, while the wide men serve as a second central midfield line. In doing so, it gave England yet another line of USMNT defense to breach and allowed all four midfielders to focus on either zonal marking or simply populating passing lanes to stymie the flow of the ball.
It was relentlessly effective once Gerrard was brought infield to partner Lampard — something we all know just does not work — as the pair couldn’t figure out just what to do. Neither could get far forward, lest they leave Donovan or Dempsey infield behind them, and they couldn’t get wide as the American pair would just drift across to the flank, aided and abetted by the CDM and fullback on that side.
See a pic here if my words are confusing (Altidore/Findlay underlined in blue, Donovan/Dempsey in pink, Bradley/Clark in green. Thanks to Zonal Marking for the visual). The other element of their infield motion was that it served to effectively box in Lampard and Gerrard. Note how in that picture they’re flanked and blocked upfield with no room to run, and no way to get the ball cleanly forward to Heskey or Rooney.
Furthermore, there was room for the full-backs to get wide thanks to the space vacated by Donovan, Dempsey, and the fullbacks shadowing them infield. Steve Cherundolo, in particular, did well getting forward down the right, providing an overlap and more opportunities for the USMNT to get the ball in from wide positions. Most importantly of all for the US, the constant link-ups between Donovan and Cherundolo kept Ashley Cole from playing his usual expansive role down the flank, a key attacking outlet for the Three Lions.
It almost reminded me of the England formation from 1966, known as “The Wingless Wonders”, a team that also used a 4-2-2-2 to keep opposing full-backs tied up infield and give room for fast players to penetrate from wide areas. I’ll stop there, though, for fear of the kind of babbling, straitjacketed mess I might become if I continue such bold parallels.
Conclusion
Capello did an awful lot wrong, but it still requires some modicum of effort on the US side to exploit those weaknesses, and Bradley’s gameplan was superlative. Despite the gulf in individual talent between the two sides, whether you think it’s massive or closing with every passing season, a well-drilled, cohesive collective can, and will, always thrive against more talented yet less organized opposition.
It’s a bastardization of the Mourinho School of Thought, itself an extension of lessons preached by Arrigo Sacchi, Valery Lobanovsky and Helenio Herrera, that dictates team cohesion and collective workrate over individual skill. The ball does all the work, and the players react accordingly.
While I won’t quite equate Bradley to those managerial geniuses yet — after all, they still need to beat Slovenia and Algeria — I give him full credit for a superb, impressive tactical gameplan that achieved its desired result. Forget Robert Green’s goalkeeping howler; this US side would have scored eventually. They played brilliantly under Bradley’s thoughtful, methodical plan.
Good analysis, JT. I wish I would have played the game longer in club and high school so I could notice all these tactical nuances.
And I also wish that we could get these insights on-air. But, alas . . .
I think I agree with all of this except Clark, I still don’t think he’s the best option.
Facing Slovenia and Algeria, it seems like Torres and Buddle would be good starting options instead of Clark and Findley, right? Neither team has the attack of England, so we can afford to me more offensive, and Torres is a much better distributor.
@Josh
I guess you want to leave yourself with expansive options on the bench as opposed to reductive. Start slow, establish territory, and then you can get creative as the opponent tires in the 2nd half.
@JT: Okay, I can see that being a good way to go about it.
He did a good job, I just wanted Torres to come on in about the 75th or 80th minute for Clark. 3 points were there for the taking, but he didn’t try to grab them.
@EF, Just read Inverting the Pyramid. Were I a teacher, I’d teach a course called History of Soccer Tactics, and that book would be the required text. Every week or so, the students would be required to watch a full 90 minutes and attempt to relate the ideas in class to the game.
@wac: same here (actually finished it in NYC before the US-Eng game). Awesome book, and should be required reading for fans. But I still find myself hard-pressed to analyze what’s actually happening while watching a game live…
Fantastic stuff, JT. As much as I’ve hated on Bradley, his gameplan on Saturday was flawless. His sub strategy…not so much. But I digress.
After a while, it becomes second nature. You watch enough games, and certain patterns begin to emerge.
Maybe I should do a Primer. In Fact, I’ll do just that today.
@jjf3: Same here. I can pick up little things here and there, but nothing as comprehensive as what JT is laying out here.
@JT: that would be indispensable.
You know what helps me analyze stuff? Playing FM as if I have no life. Speaking of which, I’m gonna play some FM until the game starts…..
I agree with this JT. I think I know 1 person whose initials are NN who probably doesn’t.
Also, please give me credit as I typed this entire thing through the stinging tears that blurred my vision.
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Carl Bromley, James Tyler. James Tyler said: The part where I give Bob Bradley credit for Saturday – http://tinyurl.com/2aqrn8k #WorldCup #USA #ENG [...]
I fell asleep in the mind-numbing midtale analytics. I think I’d rather watch Uruguay play France again
My problem with the 4-2-2-2 is that when Deuce and LD are involved in the middle if the field which is our best attacking option, there is NO width. The only one way to provide width when they pinch in, overlapping runs and our only midfielders who make those runs either have a weird mullet or was born in Scottland.
*pinch in is overlapping runs*
this is the mullet to which i am refferring
http://fcdenver.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/jose-francisco-torres.jpg
@Wanker’s Doom
Glad I could oblige
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@Tno
I see what you’re saying, but to me, the 4-2-2-2 is their shape when they don’t have the ball. It’s the reaction to losing possession, and a quick means of getting it back. They do enjoy width when on the ball; the full-backs gallop up and give overlap opportunities. Couple of good examples in the first half of Cherundolo overlapping Donovan, freezing Glen Johnson (who couldn’t decide which man to track) and the end result being good crosses that found Altidore in the middle.
In short, I think it works, though I’d like to see it against a team that doesn’t play a 4-4-2. Algeria, mocked as they are, bring a 3-5-2 to the table, and I’m curious as to whether he reasserts his wide men on the flanks instead of giving them this infield responsibility.
@JT
I guess i was just speaking generally. You were dead on for this particular game. But against Algeria, Slovenia, Mexico ect. It’s either LD and Deuce are involved and funneled to the middle with no wing support or they are lost out in Bongo bongo land. Which keeps me campaining for my counterattacking strong defensive midfield minded 4-2-3-1
JT: That’s all excellent analysis. I think against Algeria the crowded midfield might force Donovan and Dempsey wide just as a matter of covering those passing lanes, though you’ll likely see the one opposite the ball tucked in to cut out crossfield passes. So defensively it’ll be a 4-3-1-2, just with the “1″ less of a number 10 and more of a tucked winger.
FM has definitely helped me hone my tactical nous. Inverting the Pyramid is definitely one of the books I should read, but I’ve found that by generally understanding the history of the game – reading Goldblatt, Davies, Kuper, Foer, and the Guardian – also gives me a more expansive understanding of tactical evolution. Where I get stuck in is with the subtleties; it also doesn’t help that the fluidity of many squads means there are general positions, but no one player (aside from center-backs) holds a concrete position.
@Tno, Ditto x 1000. With Deuce/Donovan/Holden or DFB in the 3rd band, I think we have enough flair to create chances while keeping our two deep center mids back
The way i see it we have two holding midfielders and 2 fwd/mid hybrids soo why not take advantage of it?
/ Given my age i expect to coach the 2052 squad to victory
@Keith: So an asymmetrical 4-2-2-2? The one thing I noticed in the game was when the US had the opportunity to attack and control, the fullbacks pushed up (Cherundolo more so than Blackmouth) and lent support from deep midfield. So we were something like a 2-4-2-2. This gave Bradley the opportunity to make runs into the area, and sit behind Dempsey and LD.
@EF
Zonal Marking is a fantastic site for tactics too that I’ve discovered via UF. It has definitely helped me to enjoy the game more when thinking about the tactics and movement instead of the static formations that most broadcasters consider “tactics”.
Hey guys thanks a lot for showing that site, now I won’t graduate from college.
@JT: I disagree with your “start negative and sub positive” approach on principle. It’s mentalities like yours that cause a bunch of boring f**kin’ ties. They call it the beautiful game for a reason. Algeria and Slovenia are there for the taking. We should take it to ‘em.
I think Bob got it nearly 100% right. Would have made some subs a little earlier, and I’d definitely start Torres – or if you insist on another more holding player then Edu- the next two games.
I’m not saying to ‘throw caution to the wind’, but two defensive midfielders is overly negative against a team of Slovenia’s limited ability. We’re not playing Spain here. I anticipate Slovenia being very defensive on Friday, given their 3 points, and the presence of a guy like Torres, who’s significantly more creative than Clark, to unlock their defense I think is a must.
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Also, Glorious Leader appreciates your attempts to censor TFA’s heresies.